Why there is something rather than nothing

The finite, infinite and eternal

January 8, 2012
PAPER

Above is a link to a new paper that addresses the question of why the universe exists rather than not, or why there is something rather than nothing. I've decided to publish it on this website as something of an experiment. Having only recently picked the paper back up after trying a journal with it about two years ago, I can't be bothered submitting it to further journals and going through the peer review process, as, for a paper such as this, it is very likely to turn into an exercise in frustration for me. Although the paper revolves around a logical argument, and so is philosophy, my feelings about peer review are nicely summed up in this essay by the physicist John Moffat. Instead, I have invited some philosophers and physicists to review the paper, and with their permission then added their comments below. If anyone else would like to add a comment, as long as it is well reasoned, no more than 300 words, and you provide your real name, I will be happy to include it. Of course, if someone submits a critical comment and I don't add it, they will probably feel that I'm being biased. However, as long as a comment is of a certain standard, I promise to add it. That the exercise will be fully open will hopefully be refreshing (or at least interesting). Hopefully it will also be quite thorough. Please send any comments to peterlynds@xtra.co.nz

Please reference the paper as Lynds, P. Why there is something rather than nothing: The finite, infinite and eternal. Not A Peer Reviewed Journal, (2012).

I hope you enjoy the paper.

Best wishes

Peter Lynds

John Leslie                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              November 27, 2011

Thanks, Peter, for letting me see a .pdf file of your paper "Why the universe exists rather than nothing." I'm now co-editing a book of readings on the why-not-nothing-? question, with a large set of Suggestions for Further Reading, and it's a shame that you've not got your paper in print somewhere, which is what's at present being applied as a prerequisite of being mentioned in the Suggestions. I can tell you that the paper is interesting enough -- well researched enough, readable enough, on a topic important enough, and original and competent enough -- to be one which I'd have no hesitation in recommending to many a journal if I were chosen as a referee (and though I often add suggestions for improvement, I have virtually never recommended anything while saying at the same time that it would need to be improved in line with my suggestions: I disapprove rather strongly of dictating things to authors who are worth recommending). I also think the eternal-universe theory, as a reaction to "why-anything-?", fully deserves the section of the edited book that has been allocated to it, and that while your preferred twist to the theory, that the eternal universe is best made with a time line that is circular, isn't fully original (it has been suggested by Paul Davies, for example), it is still well worth seeing in the form that you give to it. On the other hand I'm not willing to accept that being eternal is any answer to the basic problem. An eternal rock (an example your paper itself gives) would be no more necessary, I'd say, than a rock which suddenly popped into existence (although THAT might be thought to present MORE of a problem) even if the rock were entirely unchanging instead of having its atoms jiggling around, and I don't see that a circular time line really helps in any important way (whereas it raises its own problems). And I certainly don't agree with your idea that an eternal universe, preferably with a time line that curved around and met up with itself, was the only possible answer to why the universe exists:  the edited book of readings will have sections dealing with other answers, for instance the Modal Realist answer that there's no problem with the reality of logical possibilities and that anything logically possible is real somewhere, and the Platonic answer defended in my "Infinite Minds" book.  All the best: John Leslie

Dear John,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 28 November, 2011

Thanks for your comments. I very much appreciate it. It's great that you're working on a book about the question. All the very best with it. I'll look forward to reading it. 

In relation to your comment about the "eternal-universe theory as a reaction to "why-anything?", are you possibly aware of any previous arguments similar to the one I provide in my paper? I have searched, but have been unable to find any. 

In relation to your comments about the "eternal rock", I agree. However, the argument is not that particular physical things need to be eternal, but the universe as a whole (with something, no matter how short lived, always being physically existent). 

In connection to "the Modal Realist answer" and "the Platonic answer" you defend in your "Infinite Minds" book representing ways to address the question, while I certainly believe that anything that can logically exist, does exist is in a timeless, non-physical, platonic sense, and also that such possibilities and ideas cannot fail to exist, I do not see how the existence of such possibilities or ideas can have bearing on the existence of the physical because of the non-physical - physical gap. That is, I do not think that it can be bridged. Because of their non-physical nature, I also do not see their existence as being relevant to the "why something?" question; a question I see as being solely concerned with the physical. That's not to say, however, that I don't think there is a need to provide a logical foundation for how these ideas and possibilities exist. 

Best wishes and a big thanks again

Peter 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 28 November, 2011
Thanks, Peter.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
   Yes, my Platonic answer to why-existence-? is very controversial: you'd best actually read my "Infinite Minds" (Oxford Univ. Press 2001, paperback 2003) if wanting to see why I (and lots of others, going back to Plato) think it could make sense. It is typically thought that physical things could be explained only by other physical things, or possibly also by a deity who would himself be a thing of some sort, but this could simply be wrong---and Plato thought it wrong.
   On closed time as explaining the universe, well, my last email mentioned Paul (P.C.W.) Davies and the first place he developed the idea, I believe, is in Nature Physical Science (a branch of the journal Nature) 1972, vol.240, page 3, "Closed time as an explanation of the black body background radiation"; I believe it occurs also in his book "About Time" and perhaps also at various other places in his writings----he has written so much interesting stuff that it's hard to keep track of it all. I suggest you also look at  J.R.Gott and L.-X. Li, Can the universe create itself?, Physical Review D, 29 May 1998. Or just Google things like "closed time", for the idea that time goes around in a circle is quite a common way of developing the once popular theme of Eternal Recurrence, and clearly anyone who thinks that it does will accept that the universe causes itself if a chain of causes can be self-explaining (which some think the case---they defend the eternal existence of the universe as leaving nothing to be explained since each event is explained by another that caused it: Bertrand Russell defended that in the famous Russell-Copleston radio debate--Google would quickly find it for you, I suspect). But I myself think that the chain could not explain itself, and that's probably the usual view among philosophers (e.g. Copleston, who here follows Aquinas). If an eternal rock were the entire universe, then I'd say it wouldn't be enough to explain its existence at any instant by saying it had existed at the instant before, and so on backwards ad infinitum. But others would say that that would be OK: Yes, each answer to why it existed at any moment, viz. that it had existed at the moment before, would just raise the question of why it had existed at the moment before, BUT, they say, every new question in turn gets its answer.
   Yes, I join you in your grave doubts about whether the Lewis-type explanation of the world would work, for it can seem so very obvious that there's a distinction between existing just as a possibility and existing in reality. But Lewis was a very very very clever philosopher. My "Infinite Minds" attacks him in a way that could be developed against Max Tegmark as well, if Tegmark's view that all mathematical structures exist doesn't put limits (very hard to draw!) on what could count as a mathematical structure, instead just saying with Lewis that all logical possibilities are real somewhere. The attack (cf. Alex Vilenkin on Tegmark in Vilenkin's fine book of 2006, Many Worlds in One) centers on the idea that if Lewis's system were right then we should expect chaos to break out at any moment.
   Once again, I urge you to get your material into print. Not every referee is a bigoted nuisance. Before I'd become well known, I'd get five rejections on average before an acceptance, and most referees' comments were so silly that they made one gasp, but I kept sending the things off to the next journal on the list. To keep my spirits up I always wrote the next letter submitting a paper to a further journal before sending off anything:  I could then happily get the rejection, knowing I had a letter of submission already written up for the next attempt.   Best: John Leslie

Dear John,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 28 November, 2011

Thanks for your message. Again, I very much appreciate it. I'll be sure to read your book "Infinite Minds". I'm also pleased to see that we agree on a number of things (including in regard to Paul Davies!)

In relation to closed time, yes, I was aware of the papers and book you mentioned. As the idea also goes back to the ancient Greeks and is popular in Eastern thought, I certainly don't see my paper on the topic as being original in that respect. At the same time, there are no similar models in the literature, and I also don't think that the implications of such a model for cosmology had been fully drawn out beforehand. In asking if you were aware of anything similar to my argument, I more meant in connection to it being contradictory for an eternal universe to not exist at some point during its lifetime (and the argument of what follows from that).

I agree that the "chain of causes" argument isn't sufficient to answer “why something?”. I think it can be easily dismissed by simply noting that the first event that one starts the chain with might not have existed, so the chain of preceding causes would not follow. In this vein, without using the argument contained in my present paper, I don't see how one could justify why a universe with cyclic time would exist rather than not (rather than perhaps simply saying "it just is", which was my earlier position).

In relation to submitting the paper to a journal, thanks for your encouragement. I submitted an earlier version to the BJPS over a year ago, but it was rejected on the basis of a report by a referee who, to me, quite clearly hadn't understood the paper. I was fed up and only recently picked the paper back up. Referees and my approach to foundational issues don't seem to mix very well. Publishing it online may not work, but in the least, I think it could be interesting.

Best wishes and thanks again

Peter

Sir Martin Rees                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       13 December, 2011

Dear Professor Lynds,
I'm sorry to have been slow getting back to you. Sincerest thanks for sending me your paper. I honestly don't feel I have the philosophical competence to offer useful comments. (In fact I recently attended a conference at Yale that was ostensible on the question of why there was something rather than nothing, but regret that, to quote Fitzgerald, I 'heard great argument' but 'came out by that same door as in I went'.)

My only comment concerns your remarks (in the discussion section) about the problem of an infinite past. The old steady state cosmology, with 'continuous creation' and expansion, had this property: though it doesn't describe our actual universe, it isn't clear that there is anything logically (or indeed physically) contradictory or absurd about it.
Best regards and thanks
Martin Rees

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                13 December, 2011

Just to clarify my earlier message, I realise that you support an 'eternal universe' -- what I didn't understand was why you seemed not to like the idea of 'eternal inflation' which is really a steady-state universe on a grander scale, with big bangs 'popping off' within an exponentially expanding substratum.

Martin Rees

Dear Prof. Rees,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        13 December, 2011

Thanks for your messages. I very much appreciate it. I understand regarding philosophy (although I doubt your not taking much from the conference had very much to do with you).

The issue I have with models that posit an infinite past (eternal inflation, steady state etc) is that I don't see how the universe could evolve from infinity. As I mentioned in my paper, I think a good way to illustrate the problem is to imagine a ruler with one end being infinite in length and the other finite, and then asking how it would be possible to arrive at the finite end when coming from the infinite or opposite direction. Without a point somewhere along the line from which to begin from, I don't see how this would be possible. One might simply say that, given an infinite amount of time, it would be possible, but because this still doesn't show how it would actually be accomplished, it doesn't seem to help. Immanuel Kant put the problem this way: "Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it can never be completed through successive synthesis. It thus follows that it is impossible for an infinite world-series to have passed away, and that a beginning of the world is therefore a necessary condition of the world's existence.” He then found the idea of the universe having a beginning a finite time in the past to also result in contradiction.

Of course, this isn't related to the central argument of my paper, which, if taken alone, actually compliments eternal inflation. 

Best wishes and thanks again

Peter

Adolf Grünbaum                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        3 December, 2011

Dear Peter Lynds,

In 2007, I gave a Presidential Address on “Why is there a Universe AT ALL, Rather than just Nothing?” to the 13th quadrennial international Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in Beijing, China. Therein, I argued in detail that this question is ill-conceived by begging the question: It assumes that a state of Nothingness is to be expected, so that a state of an existing world calls for (causal) explanation qua deviation from the purportedly spontaneous state of Nothingness.

Thus, in effect, I have already published the commentary you seek. If you wish, my Administrative Asst. will gladly send you a reprint upon hearing from you to what exact address she should mail it.

Best wishes,

Adolf

Dear Adolf,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  4 December, 2011

Thanks for your message. I'm glad to report that I was able to find a copy of the paper here http://www.ontologia.net/studies/2009/gruenbaum_2009.pdf 

I find a lot to like about your paper, and I certainly agree that Leibniz's and Swinburne's arguments are fatally flawed. However, I disagree that the basic question of "why something rather than nothing?" (distinct from arguments relating to the state of nothingness being preferred etc) calls for a causal explanation via "deviation from the purportedly spontaneous state of Nothingness," and that this renders the question a non-starter. Firstly, the basic question only makes two assumptions. That there is something that exists, and that it is possible nothing may have instead been the case. The questions in itself doesn't demand that it have a causal explanation via creation from nothing. By simply denying that non-existence is physically possible (contrast to logically possible), a number of possible meaningful solutions to the question open up which don't involve causal explanation via deviation from the purportedly spontaneous state of nothingness. Moreover, as long as "nothing" is a logically valid alternative to “something”, the basic question of "why something rather than nothing?" remains equally valid and in need of an explanation. As should be clear from my paper, I think a logically valid (non-contingent) answer to the PEQ in this vein is certainly possible.

In your paper you argue that just because a world in which nothing existed may be a logically valid possibility, doesn't mean that it needs an explanation as to why it doesn't pertain physically. In this regard, you use the analogy that while it is a logical possibility that a person could spontaneously change into an elephant, we don't feel the need to explain why this doesn't actually happen. However, the reason for this is because we already know and can show why this doesn't actually happen. Equally, with non-existence, one would have to firstly know and be able to show why it doesn't physically pertain before one could dismiss it as a physical possibility.

Best wishes

Peter

Carlo Rovelli                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           30 November, 2011

Peter, 
I have a question: why should there be nothing, rather than the universe?
If there is an answer, what is it? 
If there is no answer, isn't this an answer to the reason of why there is something?
Carlo

Hi Carlo,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  30 November, 2011 

Thanks for your message. Yes (that the reason that first question doesn't have an answer, is because there is something rather nothing), but it doesn't follow that something had to be the case, so nothing rather than something remains an option.   

Best wishes

Peter

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 30 November, 2011
fine. but then the question "why is there something rather than nothing?" is just a subcase of a more general question: "why something rather than something else?" and not a more fundamental question, as is presented from Leibniz on.  
but now suppose i accept your answer and start from here. then there is one more question: "why should there be a reason for something existing rather than something else?". it might, but why should it?
what's wrong with contingency?
then i do not see anymore where is the question.
what do I miss? 
carlo

Hi Carlo,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      1 December, 2011

Thanks. I'm not sure I follow, because the only other something else (contrast to something) is nothing. Although I don't think you meant it this way, the question of why the universe is the way it is and not different, is obviously a different question, and depending on whether the laws of physics are contingent or necessary, may either have a contingent or necessary answer. But the question of "why something rather than nothing?" must have a necessary answer, because a contingent one, by its nature, already admits the possibility that nothing may have been the case, so it can't answer the question in the first place. As for existence perhaps being contingent, and so there being no real answer to the question, this is from the paper:

It might be objected that it not be necessary that the PEQ be answerable (as necessitated by ii.). Could it be that there is no explanation? If this were so, the existence of the universe would be contingent (if it were necessary, there would be an explanation automatically given in order to ground its necessity). But contingency demands an explanation; if something is one way but could have been different, there must be an explanation for its being that way and not different. As outlined earlier, however, in the case of existence itself, no satisfactory contingent explanation is possible due to such an explanation already admitting the possibility of the universe not existing, and so not being capable of telling us why non-existence was indeed not the case. Consequently, one is forced into the need for a necessary explanation for existence even if one wishes to deny one is required or possible.
 
Best wishes
 
Peter 
Robert Lawrence Kuhn                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           22 December, 2011

I applaud Peter Lynds for going full throttle after the ultimate question of existence. I enjoyed reading his paper and appreciate his articulation of issues, especially the subtleties (if not the logical contradictions) of infinite and finite universes. I go with him that “this question must have an answer,” but part ways when he concludes that the “answer must establish that physical existence is inescapable and necessary.” Even if the universe were eternal, with no beginning, why would it follow, as a matter of logic, that such were the case necessarily? Could it not have been otherwise, in infinitely many ways?

There is danger of circular reasoning: If (i) only an eternal universe is capable of providing an answer to the question of why there is something rather than nothing “because at no stage during its eternal lifetime is its nonexistence ever an option,” and (ii) there must be an answer to the question, then (iii) the universe must be eternal.  But the reason that nonexistence is not an option is simply because that is the definition of eternal. What is the gain? Getting to “necessary” is not what’s happening here.

As for annulling theological explanations, well, many theologians are quite untroubled by an eternal universe (John Polkinghorne for one). The question of why the eternal universe exists in the first place cannot be answered by the claim that eternal existence entails necessary existence. Since I find no reason to consider a universe in which time is cyclic, I remain with the disquieting fact that the only viable options, an infinite universe and a finite universe, are both, as Peter tries very interestingly to show, nonsensical.

Robert Lawrence Kuhn
Creator & Host
Closer To Truth
www.closertotruth.com
Dear Robert,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              25 December, 2011
 
Thanks for your comments. I very much appreciate it. I'm also pleased to see that we agree that the idea of the universe having a beginning a finite time in the past, and that of it having an infinite past, both result in contradiction.
 
In relation to your questioning, “Even if it the universe were eternal, with no beginning, why would it follow, as a matter of logic, that such were the case necessarily?”, the answer to this question is the starting point of my argument, and the logic of it isn't really disputable. If the universe was eternal, it could not fail to exist (and so would exist necessarily), because at no point during its eternal lifetime would its non-existence ever be an option.

In relation to getting to this conclusion because of the definition of eternal, as this is to be expected (eternal means what it means [everlasting] and this is the way it's meant!), I don't understand your objection to this.

“The question of why the eternal universe exists in the first place cannot be answered by the claim that eternal existence entails necessary existence.”

No, of itself, it can't. But showing why the universe must be eternal is where the rest of the argument comes in. If one was to disagree with the conclusion that universe must be eternal, they would need to show where in the argument the logic fails.

In relation to many theists being unconcerned by the possibility of the universe being eternal, while an eternal universe wouldn't, of itself, preclude the possibly of a God existing (although an infinite past would preclude his physical existence, while a universe with cyclic time would render his existence rather silly), it should concern Creationists, because an eternal universe leaves no place for a Creator, as it neither has, nor can have, a beginning. It also leaves no room for God as an explanation for why something exists rather than nothing, as an eternal universe – a universe that he couldn't create – would, of itself, already provide one.

Considering that you find both a universe with a finite past and one with an infinite past non-sensical, I must admit that I find your dismissal of cyclic time as a viable alternative puzzling, as it is the only physical alternative, while it is also free of temporal contradictions (although I naturally support your freedom of choice!). I can't help but get the impression from this and some of your other comments, that you may already have something else in mind, and the only something else I can think of is God (i.e. a non-physically existing, uncaused one who creates the universe a finite time in the past). I think that this intuition is probably strengthened by my being aware of your interest in arguments for God's existence (to quote you, “These arguments are interesting and important, and in my opinion, the arguments for the existence of God are better than the arguments against it”), and also by the fact that a necessarily existing universe would invalidate the “Contingency argument” for God's existence (among others), that a universe with cyclic time would be so problematic for God's existence, while it also invalidates the “Contemporary Kalam Cosmological argument” advanced by William Lane Craig. Of course, my impression could obviously be completely wrong. Whatever the case, I would be happy to go further down this avenue with you, and explain why I think the idea of God creating the universe doesn't work (and why such a scenario also wouldn't offer a satisfactory solution to the question of why something rather than nothing), but I wouldn't want to unless you were interested in discussing these issues too.

Best wishes and thank again

Peter
Dear Peter:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 25 December, 2011

This is great fun; good comments. Sadly, I am well behind in edits for the new season of Closer To Truth, amidst my other responsibilities, so I can only be brief - see below. But I shall return to this when next doing CTT shows on Why Anything?

Much appreciate and best regards,

Robert

"In relation to getting to this conclusion because of the definition of eternal, as this is to be expected (eternal means what it means [everlasting] and this is the way it's meant!), I don't understand your objection to this."

I only say that the assertion simply restates the definition - perhaps we agree. So what is the gain? What follows from a tautology?

"No, of itself, it can't. But showing why the universe must be eternal is where the rest of the argument comes in. If one was to disagree with the conclusion that universe must be eternal, they would need to show where in the argument the logic fails."

I would like to see the argument laid out simply (i), (ii)…. (n).

"In relation to many theists being unconcerned by the possibility of the universe being eternal, while an eternal universe wouldn't, of itself, preclude the possibly of a God existing (although an infinite past would preclude his physical existence, while a universe with cyclic time would render his existence rather silly), it should concern Creationists, because an eternal universe leaves no place for a Creator, as it neither has, nor can have, a beginning. It also leaves no room for God as an explanation for why something exists rather than nothing, as an eternal universe – a universe that he couldn't create – would, of itself, already provide one."

I think you are confounding several strands of arguments here. Wish I had the time now to unpack

Agree about a "physical God," but no one, to my knowledge, makes that claim.

Creationists would be concerned with an eternal universe and indeed there is much disputations among believers who asset an eternal vs. finite-in-time universe.

I don't think this argument can ever eliminate the need for further explanation to Why Something. If an eternal universe, God or Something else could not create the universe temporally - agreed - but could still be the explanation for it (timelessly).

"Considering that you find both a universe with a finite past and one with an infinite past non-sensical, I must admit that I find your dismissal of cyclic time as a viable alternative puzzling, as it is the only physical alternative, while it is also free of temporal contradictions (although I naturally support your freedom of choice!)."

I mean it literally. My physics is not sufficiently advanced to have confidence in cyclic time, and even if it did, I cannot imagine how the whole edifice you propose - of a complex set of fundamental laws of quantum mechanics, strings, fields. etc., and now with the additional of cyclic time, would be the Thing that exists eternally? Why would that be? Brute fact? A consistent law of physics (looks dubious)? Would even that be "necessary." Necessary is the highest possible standard. If I were left with a complex physical universe as candidate, I'd lean more towards Swinburne's argument for a "simple explanation" (but not by force toward his kind of God). I'd even favor John Leslie's Value, the simplicity of which I like (but the creative power of which I cannot find or feel).

"I can't help but get the impression from this and some of your other comments, that you may already have something else in mind, and the only something else I can think of is God (i.e. a non-physically existing, uncaused one who creates the universe a finite time in the past)."

Where I am right now is that there must be Something which is Self-Existing by necessity, not by brute fact. I'd be surprised if It were the God of any religion. By my (broad and loose) definition, it could be the physical universe / laws of physics, perhaps as you've endowed it with cyclic time, provided that necessary self-existence therein lies. But I do not think that anything of the space-time/energy-matter realm can ever attain this standard.

"I think that this intuition is probably strengthened by my being aware of your interest in arguments for God's existence (to quote you, “These arguments are interesting and important, and in my opinion, the arguments for the existence of God are better than the arguments against it”), and also by the fact that a necessarily existing universe would invalidate the “Contingency argument” for God's existence (among others), that a universe with cyclic time would be so problematic for God's existence, while it also invalidates the “Contemporary Kalam Cosmological argument” advanced by William Lane Craig."

Demonstrating a "necessarily existing universe" is indeed the key. How are you doing that? I don't see it at all. An eternal universe is not the same kind of thing as a necessarily existing universe. And to recruit cyclic time to leap the gap, risks, I think, circular reasoning.

"Of course, my impression could obviously be completely wrong. Whatever the case, I would be happy to go further down this avenue with you, and explain why I think the idea of God creating the universe doesn't work (and why such a scenario also wouldn't offer a ssatisfactory solution to the question of why something rather than nothing), but I wouldn't want to unless you were interested in discussing these issues too."

Super interested….. in its time….

Dear Robert,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    5 January, 2012
 
Thanks for your message. I must admit that I was mindful that my last one had the potential to rub you the wrong way. That it didn't (indeed, with your arguing so well and freely, it seems quite the opposite), has really pleased (and impressed) me. Thanks.
 
"I only say that the assertion simply restates the definition - perhaps we agree. So what is the gain? What follows from a tautology?"
 
Yes, I do agree with that. But that it's a tautology (in the logical sense) is the point; it's a logical and necessary truth. Given an eternal universe, there is absolutely no way around it. I can't really understand how you would agree that the logic of it is inescapable, and then deny it holds, as there is just no possible out. The gain of it is that, in relation to the question of why something rather than nothing, this doesn't seem to have been realized before. That is, in pondering this question, a person will imagine the possibility of the universe not existing, perhaps picture a black void, and ask why something rather than nothing? In doing so, they generally won't make a differentiation between a universe with a beginning a finite time in the past and a universe with an infinite past, assuming that both could fail to exist. Even in the context of thinking about a universe with an infinite past in isolation, people assume it could fail to exist too. Of course, and again, the realization that an eternal universe cannot fail to exist doesn't of itself explain why the universe has to be eternal, but this is where the rest of the argument comes in.
 
"I would like to see the argument laid out simply (i), (ii)…. (n)."
 
Although you would need to go over the main text of the paper to qualify it, it is: (1) The idea of an eternally existing universe not existing at some point during its eternal lifetime is contradictory; logically, such a universe cannot fail to exist and so would exist necessarily. (2) The existence of a universe which begins from nothing a finite time in the past is contingent. (3) The only way to satisfactorily answer the PEQ is with a necessary explanation. (4) Only an eternal universe (contrast to a universe which begins from nothing a finite time in the past) can answer the PEQ. (5) The PEQ must have an answer. (6) The universe must be eternal.
 
"Agree about a "physical God," but no one, to my knowledge, makes that claim."
 
Many theists claim that God exists temporally, which is essentially saying this. That is, as temporal notions are entirely dependant on matter and motion, the only way he could exist temporally is if he existed physically. Indeed, considering that God isn't said to physically exist, apart from simply in a platonic sense along with all other ideas and possibilities, I don't see how God could, even just in principle, be said to exist.
 
“I don't think this argument can ever eliminate the need for further explanation to Why Something. If an eternal universe, God or Something else could not create the universe temporally - agreed - but could still be the explanation for it (timelessly).”
 
I don't see how. Again, such a universe would, of itself, already be the explanation, while, because it doesn't have a beginning, it couldn't have a cause for it's existence (whether temporal or timeless). Furthermore, without invoking magic and other absurdities, it is not possible for something that exists in a non-physical, platonic sense to bridge to the physical.
 
The thing with an eternal universe, whether one with an infinite past or with cyclic time, is that it just doesn't have, or need a cause. It exists entirely self-sufficiently, and is the reason for its own existence. Of course, it also needs matter, but this is a given with an eternal universe. Where did the matter come from? It has existed forever. I get the feeling that your problem with accepting this idea is because you're assuming that there has to be a “causal” explanation for the universe and existence. But apart from this perhaps being somewhat anthropomorphic, I don't think this can work, because a causal explanation for existence will naturally always leave the existence of the causal agent unexplained. That is, unless an explanation for existence stops with a non-causal, necessary explanation, the question cannot be answered. In the case of God creating the universe, if we ask why God would exist rather than not, other than believers saying it to be so, there is no reason to suppose that he would exist necessarily (apart from perhaps in a platonic sense). He also may have decided not to create the universe. As this would then represent a contingent universe, it couldn't tell us why non-existence was indeed not the case. Of course, one can also just deny that God can exist in any meaningful way or can bridge to physical to magic a universe out of nothing.  Alternatively, in the case of the laws of physics being the explanation for existence, with an eternal universe they couldn't be, because such a universe would necessarily exist of itself, and without a beginning, it couldn't have, nor would it need, any further explanation for its existence. Alternatively, with a universe with a beginning a finite time in the past, without invoking the need for an infinite regress of prior physical causes, the universe would have to come into existence from nothing, caused by the laws of physics. But if we then ask why the laws would exist rather than not, considering that, in the absence of anything physical, the laws couldn't have any physical reality, we are again left grasping at nothing.
   This means that the only way that the laws of physics could be the explanation for the universe and existence is if, much like God is said to, the laws were able to magically bridge from a non-physical, eternal, and timeless existence, to the physical to cause a universe out of nothing. Such a universe would also be contingent, so couldn't answer the question of why our universe exists rather than not.
 
Best wishes, thanks again, and the all very best with Closer To Truth
 
Peter